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Well into the fifth decade of the Third Wave of global democratiza-
tion, we know that getting to democracy is, relatively speaking, the easy 
part. Sustaining it is more difficult. From Russia to Thailand and from 
Mali to Turkey, initial breakthroughs to open politics have been aborted 
as security services or high-handed executives have scrapped civil liber-
ties and returned to rigged elections.
In postcommunist Eurasia, a region littered with failed democratic 
experiments and frozen autocracies, Mongolia stands out. Not only did 
it make a clean break with its authoritarian past when its Soviet-style 
regime collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, but it has avoided back-
sliding as well.
Mongolia’s most recent parliamentary elections on 29 June 2016 con-
firmed its status as a democracy. The contest met exacting international 
standards for propriety. It was administered efficiently using electronic 
voting, which made possible public announcements of the results as they 
came in on the night of June 29. The system virtually eliminated the danger 
of fraudulent vote-counting and bolstered the credibility of the process.
As in previous contests, two parties predominated: the Mongolia Peo-
ple’s Party (MPP), the successor to the communist Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP), and the Democratic Party (DP), the rela-
tively liberal party of change founded at the outset of the transition in 
1989-90. In 2016 the MPP won resoundingly, capturing 65 of 76 seats. 
During the prior session of parliament (2012-16), the DP had held a 
narrow plurality and led a broad coalition. The alternation in power was 
typical: Of the seven contests held since democratization commenced, 
four have produced a turnover.
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The 2016 election was not without its problems, including a last-
minute switch in the electoral system. Electoral rules in Mongolia are 
notoriously fluid. With the exception of the 2012 contest, elections 
have been based on a majoritarian principle. The 1992 and 2008 elec-
tions used the block vote, with voters in 26 districts casting 2, 3 and 
4 votes, depending on district size, for the same number of seats in 
parliament. Elections in 1996, 2000, and 2004 had used a pure first-
past-the-post electoral system in 76 districts. The 2012 elections fol-
lowed a mixed formula: Forty-eight seats were allocated by plurality 
vote in 26 electoral districts with district magnitudes ranging from 
1 to 3, while 28 seats were awarded via proportional representation 
based on party lists. The amendments to the electoral law in 2016 re-
installed a pure majoritarian system with 76 single-member districts 
(SMDs), the same rules that had been in place during the 1996, 2000 
and 2004 contests.1
Revisions in electoral rules do not per se violate democratic norms, 
but relentless volatility and changes on the eve of the balloting come 
dangerously close to doing so. In March 2012, the Constitutional Court 
affirmed the mixed majoritarian/proportional format, but in April 2016 
the Court ruled that PR was unconstitutional, and parliament swiftly 
switched back to a pure SMD system. The biggest cause for concern 
was that parliament, in amending the electoral law in December 2015, 
dropped a provision that forbids rule changes within six months of the 
election. The move opened a loophole for very late changes, which were 
made in May 2016. If Mongolia’s electoral practices suffer from a real 
flaw, it is chronic inconstancy and last-minute adjustments in the rules. 
Greater consistency and a ban on eleventh-hour changes would make an 
otherwise sound electoral system better.
Changes in electoral rules are almost always driven by political con-
siderations, and Mongolia’s 2016 revisions were no exception. Lead-
ers of the DP flipped the switch back to pure majoritarianism because 
they thought it would enable them and their smaller partners to cling 
to a parliamentary majority even if their opponents made gains in the 
popular vote. The electoral engineers proved to be too smart by half: 
The new rules only magnified the MPP’s victory, enabling it to claim 
86 percent of seats, though its candidates won only 46 percent of the 
vote. The DP’s parliamentary presence was decimated, with its candi-
dates receiving 34 percent of the vote but just 12 percent of seats. Such 
artless machinations are not uncommon. In Palestine’s 2006 elections, 
for example, changes in the rules backed by the ruling Fatah party 
ended up handing a disproportionate share of seats to Hamas, which 
gained a big majority in the legislature despite edging out Fatah by just 
three percent of the vote.
In Mongolia, despite these problems, competition was vigorous, 
the media open, and procedural irregularities few. All major players 
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accepted the result.2 The vote marked an unbroken quarter-century of 
democracy.
A Democracy That Should Not Exist
Mongolia presents a paradox. By the lights of conventional theories, 
it should not be a democracy at all. Scholars have found that geographi-
cal proximity to other democracies confers advantages, but Mongolia’s 
closest neighbors, China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, are all autocracies. 
Mongolian democracy remains robust even in the face of potentially 
detrimental diffusion effects.
Mongolia is not just an overachiever in its neighborhood; it does well 
globally compared to other countries at its level of development. Greater 
wealth has long been associated with more open politics, and Mongolia 
is not a rich country. Its per capita income of about $12,000 at Purchas-
ing Power Parity is less than half of Russia’s and roughly equivalent 
to the figures for Jordan and Egypt. Among Third Wave democratizers 
with incomes per capita of $15,000 or less, only Mongolia, Benin, and 
S~ao Tomé and Príncipe have been rated Free by Freedom House in ev-
ery annual survey for the past twenty-five years.3 Mongolia represents a 
remarkable case of robust democracy amid material scarcity.
This unbroken streak is especially noteworthy given the lopsided ma-
jorities and single-party-led governments that elections often produce 
in Mongolia. In many new democracies, the capture of a large major-
ity by a single party is often followed by a systematic effort to rig the 
system to guarantee that party’s perpetuation in power. Hungary under 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkey under Prime Minister and now 
President Recep Tayyip Erdo¢gan are two prominent examples. In Mon-
golia, however, even though one of the two major parties has held an 
overwhelming majority in parliament much of the time, neither has used 
its advantage to rig the system. Part of the reason may be in the exis-
tence of a directly elected president who enjoys a real veto (a two-thirds 
supermajority is required to override it) and who has often hailed from 
the rival party to the parliamentary majority. Most power in Mongo-
lia is vested in parliament and the prime minister is the most powerful 
politician, but the president’s veto power, as well as his leading role 
in judicial appointments, gives him some countervailing authority. The 
current president, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, is a DP stalwart who can be 
expected to resist overreaching on the part of the new MPP government. 
That said, Elbegdorj will leave office in mid-2017 and could be replaced 
in the June 2017 presidential election by an MPP politician, leaving the 
entire government in the hands of a single party.
In the past, the presidency and the parliament have sometimes been 
under the control of the same party. In 1996–97 and 2012–16, the DP 
was fully in charge, and in 2000–2004 and 2008–2009 the MPP was in 
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control, yet democracy survived. Politicians have tinkered with election 
rules but have done nothing to lock in one party’s dominance, and the 
losers generally accept the results. Even when there is little pushback 
from within the system, elites in power tend to respect the rules. The 
MPP’s virtual monopoly today is cause for concern, but there is prec-
edent for democracy persisting despite single-party dominance.
One key to maintaining pluralism even in the presence of such poten-
tially unfavorable conditions is Mongolia’s powerful civil society. The 
absence of pushback from within the system does not leave officials 
unconstrained, since they must grapple with a host of pressures from 
below. While analysts have noted that postcommunist polities tend to 
have relatively weak civil societies, Mongolia is an exception.4 From the 
first sign of its opening in 1989 to the present day, autonomous inter-
est groups and social movements (here often jointly referred to as civil 
society organizations, or CSOs) have helped keep officialdom honest, 
or at least nervous, and the polity open. Their vigor provides a key to 
understanding the persistence of democracy.
Civil Society and Democracy
A rich civil society has long been seen as a boon to democracy. 
Alexis de Tocqueville attributed the robustness of the democracy he 
found in Jacksonian America in part to Americans’ inclination to band 
together into self-constituted organizations for every conceivable cause. 
Contemporary Tocquevillians such as Robert Putnam also see spirited 
nonstate associations as democracy’s ally.5
Not all scholars tout a strong civil society. Some argue that extremist, 
fanatical, or destructive CSOs are as likely to emerge as benign ones. 
The skeptics often adduce Weimar Germany, which was rich in nonstate 
associations at the time of Hitler’s rise. They see restive, well-organized 
masses as at least as great a threat to democracy as are high-handed 
elites.6
There is no doubt that civil society can include bad apples, and strong 
CSOs are no substitute for sturdy state institutions. But empirical sup-
port for the case against a strong civil society is paltry, and arguments 
that emphasize the “lessons of Weimar” have an anachronistic ring. 
In the postwar world, democratization has been derailed far more fre-
quently by governing elites—typically chief executives—than by unruly 
grassroots movements.7 There is a reason why Russia’s Vladimir Putin, 
Belarus’s Aleksandr Lukashenko, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
and other autocrats work so assiduously to thwart the emergence of po-
tent CSOs: They know that societal lethargy and demobilization suit 
their interests. The last thing they want to face is an assertive, well-
organized civil society.
Mongolia’s postcommunist experience illustrates the trouble vigor-
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ous CSOs can cause for rulers who would prefer electorates that remain 
ignorant and manipulable, underprivileged groups that are resigned to 
their fate, and government operations that are safely shielded from pes-
ky public prying. In fact, from the outset of its transition, Mongolia’s 
muscular civil society has differed starkly from Russia’s anemic one, 
which helps explain why Mongolian democratization has been so much 
more successful.8 Mongolian civil society engages in all the democra-
cy-enhancing functions that Tocqueville identified in early nineteenth-
century America. Examining four of those functions and the groups that 
perform them illustrates how a vibrant civil society sustains democracy 
despite unfavorable structural conditions.
Perhaps the best-known function of civil society is pushing back 
against the state, and Mongolian democracy was born amid an upsurge 
of popular movements to resist the Soviet-type regime and carve out 
spaces for free expression. The demonstrations that would quickly help 
topple the regime started in the provincial capital of Hovd, on 7 Decem-
ber 1989. This illegal gathering led to the founding of the Mongolian 
Democratic Union, the Democratic Socialist Movement, and the New 
Progressive Union. In the first half of 1990, after rolling waves of mass 
protests and hunger strikes, the country’s new prodemocratic parties met 
with the MPRP and got it to renounce its monopoly on power, grant civil 
liberties, release political detainees, and hold free national parliamen-
tary elections. While MPRP candidates won the July vote, the popular 
uprising had already helped reduce the Party to a party. Due in large part 
to the push from below, Mongolia held its first free elections at the same 
time that the countries of Eastern Europe held theirs, over a year before 
the demise of the USSR.9
Controlling state power once democracy takes hold requires less ro-
mantic but no less vital efforts, and few causes are less glamorous or 
more important than curtailing officials’ ability to shield their actions 
from public scrutiny. Officials often press for a degree of secrecy in 
government operations that goes far beyond the requirements of national 
security. Ensuring that they have to live with uncomfortably high levels 
of transparency is an ongoing struggle in all democracies, but it is es-
sential for sustaining an open political regime.
In Mongolia, as in all fledgling democracies, establishing rules and 
norms that ensure citizens’ access to information is a tall order, but sev-
eral organizations have pressed the cause and racked up real accom-
plishments. One is Globe International (GI), a nonmembership NGO 
founded in 1999. It has received funding from the Open Society Insti-
tute, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and USAID.
GI launched its efforts in 2002 with a year-long project called “The 
Right to Know: Freedom of Information.” It organized workshops and 
seminars in addition to a roundtable with parliamentarians. It established 
links with Article 19, a British human rights organization that takes its 
134 Journal of Democracy
name from the part of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that enjoins the right “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
through any media regardless of frontiers.” In 2004–2005 GI published 
several guidebooks on freedom of information and deepened its work 
with parliament and with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. The 
ministry agreed to work with a draft law on freedom of information 
drawn up by GI lawyers and their international partner, Article 19.
Unsurprisingly, the push to enact sweeping legislation ensuring pub-
lic access to government operations elicited something less than frenzied 
enthusiasm on the part of governing elites. In 2005-2006, the cabinet 
discussed submitting a draft law to parliament but decided to postpone 
action pending further study of information-security issues. In 2007, a 
group of five progressive MPs submitted a draft law to their colleagues 
but parliament did not take action. In 2008, the government included a 
proposed law on freedom of information in its Action Plan for 2008-
2012. To many politicians, freedom of information seemed like the kind 
of thing that should end up in that long-beloved graveyard of nice things 
that will never really happen, the Four or Five Year Plan. 
Now abundantly aware that more years of vigorous advocacy would 
be necessary, GI pulled together an alliance of ten NGOs into a lobby-
ing coalition as part of a larger project dubbed Better Access to Reduce 
Corruption. In 2009, the president of GI and the director of the Open 
Society Forum met with the MPs who had submitted a draft law two 
years earlier and the participants agreed to write a new draft law. Af-
ter another year of roundtables, public presentations, coalition-building, 
draft-law revisions, and intensive lobbying, the government approved 
Resolution No. 143 on information transparency and submitted its own 
draft law to parliament. In mid-2011, almost a decade after GI initiated 
its Right to Know campaign, parliament enacted the Law on Information 
Transparency and Right to Access Information.10
The statute is a remarkable achievement. It requires that the govern-
ment’s budgets, finances, and procurement activities be made public, 
and it specifies how agencies are to release information. It stipulates 
that all government funds allocated to the media, including expenditure 
on advertising, be a matter of public record. It grants all citizens and 
legal entities the right to request information and obliges officials to 
respond within seven working days. The law includes provisions for 
shielding highly sensitive information, as is standard in even the most 
open polities. Abuse of such provisions by power holders is universal in 
authoritarian regimes, which typically promise their citizens a bouquet 
of rights and then eviscerate them with dubiously broad interpretations 
of exemptions for “security” and “the public interest.”11 Over the half-
decade since its passage, however, Mongolia’s law has shown that it has 
real teeth. It might even be affecting the way the government operates. 
In Transparency International’s yearly Corruption Perceptions Index 
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(CPI), Mongolia has posted notable gains every year since the law was 
passed, moving between 2011 and 2015 from the thirty-fourth percentile 
in the global rankings of countries to the fifty-seventh.12
The law certainly would never have been enacted without tenacious 
pressure from GI and allied CSOs—especially since freedom of infor-
mation is rarely pursued by governing elites and has little allure to most 
members of the general public.
Few things are more important for sustaining democracy than keeping 
government operations open. Voters, after all, can act only on informa-
tion they have; the quality of their choices depends on how much they 
know about their leaders’ behavior in office. What is more, politicians’ 
probity is always a function of how much they must reveal. Groups such 
as GI advance democracy by keeping voters in the know—and politi-
cians on notice.
Assisting the State
While monitoring and checking state power is an important function 
of civil society, the relationship between civil society and the state can 
be cooperative as well as antagonistic. GI’s work on drafting a law on 
freedom of information is an example of how an autonomous organiza-
tion can use its expertise to help the state make policy. Another case is 
the Mongolian National Federation of the Blind (MNFB). It has gone a 
step further, assuming burdens that otherwise would fall to the state but 
that state agencies have failed to shoulder effectively.
The MNFB, founded under communist rule in 1978, functioned as 
most “popular” organizations did in Soviet-type regimes: It ostensibly 
represented popular interests but actually was controlled entirely from 
above. Like other such groups, it did more to create the appearance of 
advocacy than actually to engage in it. In 1993, however, shortly after 
the demise of the Soviet-type regime, the MNFB became independent. 
Thereafter it became a dynamic defender of the interests of the blind and 
of disabled people more generally, as well as a real help to the state in 
advancing their welfare. Assistance from abroad has been crucial: The 
MNFB is funded by a grant from the Danish International Development 
Agency.
The MNFB started flexing its muscles during the middle of the 2000s, 
when it staged hunger strikes to call attention to the plight of the dis-
abled. In Mongolia, as in many developing countries, the disabled have 
often been hidden away and had their access to employment and public 
services severely restricted. The hunger strikes raised public awareness, 
leading in 2012 to the creation of a Department for Development of 
Persons with Disabilities Protection within the Ministry of Population 
Development and Social Protection.
The hunger strikes also prompted the government to invite represen-
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tatives of the MNFB to assist parliamentary committees with drawing 
up legislation. The group subsequently used its access to develop a re-
lationship with official bodies that enabled it both to press its cause in 
the corridors of power and to assist official bodies with making and 
implementing laws. In 2013, the MNFB took over drafting a new law 
and identified a champion of its cause among MPs, Oyun Sanjaasuren. 
Oyun headed the parliamentary working group that drew up the final 
draft, and she then carried the bill into the legislature for consideration.
In February 2016, parliament passed the Law on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, which aims to eliminate discrimination and to 
integrate people with disabilities into mainstream society. The new law 
promotes understanding of disability among officials and the general 
public. It stipulates measures to improve the living and working condi-
tions of the disabled, requiring enforcement of standards in buildings, 
infrastructure, and public transportation. It also defines the rights of 
people with disabilities to education, work, health, and social protection. 
At the time the law was enacted, the leader of the MNFB, Gerel Don-
dow, became a special adviser to Mongolia’s president on the rights of 
the disabled. Her status affords her full access to parliament and the 
right to interact freely with MPs, and it gives lawmakers a direct line to 
a leader of the disabled who can offer information and advice on policy. 
The MNFB increased its efforts both to pressure and to aid policy mak-
ers when it established under the city council of Ulaanbaatar a Coun-
cil of the Disabled Person, with 15 members from the city council and 
seven representatives from CSOs representing the disabled.
In addition to interacting with the state in a manner that has reshaped 
the way officialdom deals with the disabled, the MNFB has established a 
nationwide apparatus to provide services and employment for the blind. 
The MNFB has 9,500 members and a paid staff of 52, with branches 
in each of Mongolia’s 21 provinces. It runs its own center for teaching 
braille and the use of computers, and employs some of those it serves in 
a printing operation that produces books in braille. It has its own radio 
station, staffed by the blind and the partially sighted. It also runs a fac-
tory employing the blind and the partially sighted that produces the gers 
(yurts) that many Mongolians use as dwellings.13
The MNFB furnishes a noteworthy case of how a CSO can enhance 
the quality of legislation and the provision of public services, and there-
by help the state to overcome information and resource constraints. 
Left to their own resources, government officials lacked the expertise 
and motivation needed to push for legislation that would really help 
the disabled. The MNFB stepped in to draw up the draft legislation that 
lawmakers subsequently used as the basis for what would become the 
Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As might be expected 
in a developing country such as Mongolia, the government also lacked 
the resources to create a substantial number of jobs for blind and other 
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disabled people. So the MNFB set up its own enterprises, providing 
gainful employment for people who might otherwise have had no job 
prospects at all. By assuming such tasks itself, the MNFB engages in 
burden-sharing with the state, relieving pressure on state agencies and 
bolstering the regime’s legitimacy.
Without the efforts of the MNFB, the disabled and their families 
might feel excluded from the corridors of power as well as the work-
place. As it is, however, they have developed a stake in the stability of a 
political order under which they have made real gains.
The MNFB also shows how some organizations with roots in the 
Soviet era were able to become real vehicles for the representation of 
popular interests under a democratic regime. In many other postcommu-
nist countries, public organizations with communist origins have either 
withered or remained tools of the state. Mongolia’s MNFB shows that 
organizations that did more to mimic representation than to advance 
popular interests during Soviet times can become autonomous and as-
sertive in an open polity—even while they continue to assist the state 
and enhance regime legitimacy.
Pushing Back Against Powerful Economic Interests
A strong civil society can check powerful interests in society as well 
as guard against an overweening state. An example is the Ongi River 
Movement (ORM) and its successor organization, the United Movement 
of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL), which has scored victories 
on behalf of Mongolia’s nomadic peoples against large mining corpora-
tions.
The ORM was founded in 2001 in three provinces through which the 
Ongi flows. The group’s mission was to reverse the desiccation of the 
Ongi River system and Ulaan Lake. The river system originally spanned 
435 kilometers, but intensive gold mining activity reduced it to just 100 
kilometers and led to the drying up of Ulaan Lake. The Konrad Ad-
enauer Foundation, an NGO affiliated with Germany’s Christian Demo-
cratic Party, provided start-up support, and the movement subsequently 
attracted funding from the Asia Foundation, USAID, Mercy Corps, and 
the Open Society Forum.
In 2002, the ORM sponsored a study that concluded that mining activi-
ties had diverted a dozen rivers and prevented them from flowing prop-
erly into the Ongi. The group presented its findings to key parliamentar-
ians and lobbied the Ministry of Nature and the Environment to conduct 
its own investigations. The following year, ORM leaders sent a letter to 
Mongolia’s president and submitted a petition to the prime minister urg-
ing action to restore the river system. The appeal was signed by 1,200 
people, most of whom resided in the districts affected by the devastation.
The movement’s activity picked up steam in 2004. In the May and 
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June, two thousand activists held a protest march tracing the original 
435 kilometer path of the Ongi River, and organized twelve public ral-
lies along the way, including one at a gold mine. The media provided 
extensive coverage of the events, which generated widespread public 
sympathy. Following the march, the ORM and a governmental agency, 
the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority (MRPA), conducted a 
joint tour of gold mining sites. They were joined by governors of three 
affected districts as well as by representatives of the mining companies. 
The MRPA then commissioned a comprehensive study into the causes of 
river and lake depletion. The ORM strengthened its lobbying power by 
recruiting a group of parliamentarians to act as advisers and improve the 
organization’s ties with government agencies. The ORM grew and ac-
quired allies in civil society dedicated to environmental protection.14 In 
2008-2009, the ORM and affiliates came together to form the UMMRL, 
which sent activists, accompanied by officials and academic specialists, 
through every region of Mongolia to delineate environmental protection 
zones and negotiate new arrangements with affected local populations.
The time was ripe for governmental action, but curbing the power of 
the mining companies was no small task. When parliament dragged its 
feet on legislation, the UMMRL launched a hunger strike. At the same 
time, UMMRL activists worked with sympathetic MPs to draft legisla-
tion. The result was the so-called “law with the long name”: the Law to 
Prohibit Mineral Exploration and Mining Operations at the Headwaters 
of Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas.15
Even after the law was passed, another round of radical action was 
required to force its implementation. In May of 2011, hundreds of no-
madic herders traveled to Ulaanbaatar and staged a hunger strike in Ch-
inggis Square in the heart of the capital. In October, Mongolia’s Su-
preme Court heard a case brought by the UMMRL, and issued a decision 
obligating the government to enforce a ban on mining in river and forest 
areas. This essentially forced the government to begin seriously imple-
menting the “law with the long name.”16
The tug of war continues between the organizations of nomads and their 
supporters, on one side, and politicians who are continually being enticed 
by well-endowed mining interests on the other. This conflict has become a 
permanent feature of Mongolia’s contentious political landscape. In Feb-
ruary 2015, the government took up amendments to the “law with the 
long name,” prompting a new round of hunger strikes and demonstrations. 
Despite the protests, on the eve of the Mongolian New Year—with public 
scrutiny of government in abeyance—parliament quietly passed amend-
ments that eased some restrictions on the mining companies.17 
As these 2015 amendments to the “law with the long name” show, the 
UMMRL and its allies do not win every battle. Still, for scattered and 
impoverished rural communities such as Mongolia’s nomads to score 
real victories against immensely wealthy multinational companies is a 
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noteworthy achievement. Despite some setbacks, the UMMRL and its 
allies have succeeded in halting dozens of destructive mining opera-
tions that threatened rivers and lakes in the Ongi River Basin, thereby 
protecting large swaths of pastureland used by nomads.18 Such David-
beats-Goliath moments are rare in developing countries—and, for that 
matter, in advanced industrialized democracies as well. Nearly all of 
Mongolia’s urban population is no more than two generations removed 
from the desert and the steppe, and more than a third of Mongolians still 
live in these areas. Checking the mining companies’ takeover of the land 
preserves a millennia-old way of life and slows the influx of people from 
the countryside into Ulaanbaatar, where they often face dim prospects.
The UMMRL, together with other grassroots environmental organi-
zations that it has spawned, inspired, and supported, helps make de-
mocracy work for many of Mongolia’s nomads. Even in the face of 
mighty business firms indifferent to the delicate ecosystems that sustain 
the country’s traditional communities, the UMMRL fights for the per-
petuation of a way of life that is intimately tied to what it means to be 
Mongolian. It also deters the takeover of the state by mining interests 
that can readily afford to ingratiate themselves financially with every 
one of Mongolia’s 76 MPs—and a few ministers to boot. It would be 
hard to imagine a movement more directly and powerfully bolstering 
democracy.
Articulating and Pressing Social Demands
Advancing the interests of traditionally underprivileged groups 
against the powerful is one of the most significant functions of CSOs. 
The UMMRL does this by pushing back against the mining compa-
nies that threaten the nomads’ grasslands. Other organizations assist 
disadvantaged groups without necessarily confronting a corporate or 
government opponent. In some cases, the foe is ignorance, shame, and 
silence.
The National Center against Violence (NCAV) is such an organiza-
tion. It has raised public consciousness about violence against women 
and advocated legislation that has reshaped the way the law deals with 
the problem. It has eighteen branches throughout the country, runs six 
shelters, and employs a staff of twenty. The Asia Foundation was one 
of the first organizations to provide funding for the NCAV’s activi-
ties.19
The NCAV was founded in 1995 by an alliance of three women’s 
groups: The Liberal Women’s Brain Pool, Women for Social Progress, 
and the Mongolian Women Lawyers Association (MWLA). The NCAV 
brings the age-old and rampant problem of domestic violence out of the 
shadows. Its early efforts included conducting a survey of 5,000 respon-
dents, as well as a large follow-up survey. It then carried out studies of 
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child abuse in 2001 and of elder abuse in 2003. Its research strategy and 
methods are bold and imaginative, involving not only high-quality surveys 
but also extensive interviews and the use of hospitals’ forensic records.
Armed with information drawn from its studies, the NCAV has trans-
formed public discourse about violence against women. Its leaders ap-
pear in the electronic and print media, conduct public seminars, and 
relay letters from victims of domestic violence to high-ranking public 
officials. At the beginning of the century it began to move into electoral 
politics. In the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, it teamed up 
with the MWLA to urge candidates to include a promise to advance leg-
islation against domestic violence in their platforms. In 2003, the NCAV 
published a summary of the findings from all of its previous studies and 
set about using the information to push for new legislation.
Officialdom responded. Shortly after publication of the document, 
parliament set up working groups composed of representatives from the 
police, the courts, the prosecutor’s office, and the media. The NCAV 
director, Enkhjargal Davaasuren, and MWLA director Chinchuluun 
Naidandorj assumed key leadership positions on the working groups. 
In 2004, parliament’s Legal Affairs Standing Committee brought in the 
directors of the NCAV and the MWLA to address MPs and make the 
case for stringent new legislation. The result was the Law on Fighting 
Domestic Violence, jointly sponsored by 19 MPs (a quarter of all mem-
bers) and passed by unanimous vote in May 2004.20
The law requires police to accept and file complaints of domestic 
violence, visit the sites of incidents, interrogate offenders, and bring 
victims to a hospital or a shelter. It also provides for sanctions against 
offenders, including expulsion from the home; prohibitions on the use 
of joint property, on contacting victims, and on access to minors; and 
compulsory training aimed at behavior modification.21
Groups such as the NCAV and the MWLA buttress democracy by 
giving otherwise voiceless people—in this case, victims of domestic 
violence—a stake in the democratic regime. Even when people might 
feel powerless and left behind by politicians, advocacy organizations 
such as the NCAV and the MWLA give them a voice.
The vigor of such CSOs might explain why, even when Mongolians 
overwhelmingly express disapproval of the government, they consis-
tently support the democratic regime. Surveys conducted by Mongolia’s 
leading polling agency show a decline of confidence in the economy and 
the quality of government over the past several years. Yet in a spring 
2016 survey, 67 percent of respondents say that “governance through 
democratically elected representatives of the people” is “good” or 
“rather good,” while just 21 percent consider it “rather bad” or “bad.”22 
The most recent wave of Asian Barometer surveys, conducted in 2014, 
largely corroborates these findings. To be sure, not all its findings are 
unequivocally favorable. Asked whether “democracy is always prefer-
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able” or “authoritarian government can be preferable,” 44 percent affirm 
the former and 35 percent the latter. The numbers show that over a third 
of Mongolians conceive the possibility that authoritarianism might be 
better than democracy. Some other survey items, however, more un-
equivocally affirm popular commitment to democracy. Asked whether 
they believe that “democracy may have its problems, but it is still the 
best form of government,” 82 percent agree versus just 16 percent who 
do not.23
Current Challenges
Despite its muscular civil society, Mongolian democracy faces im-
mense challenges. One is the dominance of a single party. The dedica-
tion of the ruling MPP to pluralism is not in question at the moment, but 
neither can it be taken for granted. After the party’s electoral triumph in 
2016, it took all 16 ministerial positions itself. Single-party hegemony 
can pose a challenge to open government under the best of conditions. 
And it is difficult to argue that Mongolia faces the best of conditions. 
Its neighbors’ aversion to democracy in their vicinity has only grown 
in recent years. Russia in particular is investing heavily in international 
autocracy-promotion.24
Mongolia’s current economic crisis might make it especially vul-
nerable to pressures and enticements from abroad. The recent slump in 
commodities prices has left the country in need of financial help, and 
some Mongolian leaders are eying China as a potential alternative to the 
IMF.25 If Mongolia is to avoid falling under the sway of neighbors who 
have little but contempt for democracy, Western-led financial institu-
tions will need to commit to supporting the country’s sagging finances.
The dramatic expansion in the mining of gold and other precious met-
als poses its own set of challenges. Governing elites typically have an 
especially hard time controlling themselves in resource-rich economies, 
often with grim consequences for democracy. In Russia, the colossal 
official corruption that resource wealth fueled in the 1990s led many 
ordinary people to decide that democracy was no barrier to being ripped 
off by their rulers. The experience soured Russians on democracy and 
boosted the appeal of a leader who pledged to reduce corruption and 
break the oligarchs’ control over the state, whatever the consequences 
for democracy. What is more, as Russia’s new post-Soviet reformers 
helped themselves to lucre from oil, their interests in open government 
waned; they had too much to hide.26
A Russian-style scenario is conceivable in Mongolia, but the vitality 
of civil society gives Mongolian democracy an advantage. Transparency 
watchdogs such as GI and its allies certainly have not eliminated corrup-
tion, but they have pried open government budgets, finances, and pro-
curement practices, helping to prevent the kind of extortionate free-for-
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all seen in Russia and so many other resource-rich economies. Militant 
grassroots environmental protection organizations such as the ORM and 
the UMMRL resist the capture of the state by mighty multinational min-
ing companies. Groups such as the MNFB aid the state in policy making 
while pressing the demands of a social group whose interests have tra-
ditionally been overlooked. The NCAV brings painful social problems 
out of the shadows and advances the interests of an immense but until 
recently silent social group, victims of domestic violence. Mongolia’s 
potent civil society sector may not be sufficient to ensure that the coun-
try’s remarkable democratic experiment will continue to prosper, but it 
has been an indispensable component of its success so far. 
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